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Abstract: 
 
We examine how group-specific differences in reservation wage, arising due to asymmetries 
in social entitlements, impact distribution via the joint determination of class conflict between 
workers and employers, and „ethnic‟ conflict among workers.  We model a two-dimensional 
contest, where two unions, representing different sections of workers, jointly but non-
cooperatively invest resources against employers in enforcing an exogenously given rent, 
while also contesting one another.  The rent arises from a „living‟ wage, set above reservation 
wage rates via labour regulations.  We show that high reservation wage workers gain, and 
employers lose, from better social entitlements for low reservation wage workers.  The latter 
however benefit, with employers and against the former, from weak labour regulations.  
When minority/immigrant workers are marginalized both in the labour market and in non-
wage entitlements, improving job access and expanding „social support‟ has contradictory 
effects on class and ethnic conflicts.  „Trade unionism‟, i.e. political articulation of shared 
economic interests alone, appears insufficient to temper ethnic conflicts among workers.   
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1.  Introduction 
Conflict between workers across ethnic or religious divides is typically perceived as reducing their 
collective strength as a class in the common distributive conflict against employers.
1
  The key 
strategic question frequently facing political formations on the Left is thus how class unity among 
workers may be achieved in practice.  At the same time, greater mobilization of workers in their 
common economic conflict against employers is also often considered an effective barricade against 
ethnic conflict within the working class.  The idea appears to be that the very provision of a political 
platform for articulating common economic interests of workers would serve to reduce conflicts 
within the working class along identity fault-lines by revealing to them the ultimately self-defeating 
consequences of such „fratricidal‟ warfare.2  Yet, in practice, attacks on one section of workers by 
another are often sought to be legitimized by the argument that the former are objectively advancing 
the interests of employers against those of the working class as a whole.  Thus, for example, during 
the anti-immigrant riots in South Africa in May 2008, Black South Africans involved in the violence 
were reported as accusing foreigners of undoing years of fighting against white rule and undermining 
the minimum wage.
3
  Differences in reservation wage rates between native and immigrant workers 
impacted both class conflict between workers and employers and ethnic conflict among workers: 
these two dimensions of distributive conflict in turn conditioned one another. 
 Individuals often acquire a quantum of resources purely by virtue of their membership in 
some collectivity.  Identity divisions among workers, in conditions where they acquire political 
salience, also often largely overlap with historically generated differences in such „social‟ (i.e., non-
market) entitlements.  Social entitlements in turn determine the minimal terms under which an 
individual is willing to accept employment, i.e. her reservation wage.  Workers from communities 
                                                 
1
  Lenin‟s 1905 address to Jewish workers in Russia provides a clear, and oft-cited, articulation:  “(T)he 
Jewish workers, as a disenfranchised nationality, not only suffer general economic and political oppression, but 
they also suffer under the yoke which deprives them of the elementary civil rights.  The heavier this yoke, the 
greater the need for the closest possible unity among the proletarians of the different nationalities; for without 
such unity a victorious struggle against the general oppression is impossible” (Lenin, 1986: p. 42).    
2
 For example, Barack Obama attempted to trump racial divisions with a call to working class unity 
during his 2008 US Presidential campaign: “(T)his time we want to talk about the fact that the real problem is 
not that someone who doesn't look like you might take your job; it's that the corporation you work for will ship 
it overseas for nothing more than a profit”  (Speech in Philadelphia: The Guardian, London, 18 March 2008).   
3
 “Other locals expressed anger, arguing that Africans from neighbouring countries were prepared to 
work for only $4 a day when they insist on a minimum wage of at least $12.  They were also angry with white 
South Africans who employ foreigners for what they say is next to nothing.  Responding to the charge that black 
South Africans are lazy and unwilling to work as hard as their poorer neighbours and were chasing away the 
competition, the group asked why they should have to toil for so little or be poor in a country rich with 
diamonds and gold” (“S Africa violence reaches Cape Town”: Al Jazeera English, 23 May 2008, 
http://english.aljazeera.net/).  Britain witnessed analogous tensions in January 2009, when thousands of British 
workers staged unofficial strikes and walk outs against the use of Italian and Portuguese workers at the Lindsey 
Oil Refinery.  While strikers demanded “British jobs for British workers” and immigrant workers had to be 
placed under police protection, union leaders spoke the language of class.  “Derek Simpson, the joint leader of 
Unite said: „The unofficial action taking place across the UK is not about race or immigration, it‟s about class.  
It‟s about employers who exploit workers regardless of their nationality by undercutting their hard won pay and 
conditions‟” (“Fresh talks in foreign worker row”: The BBC, 3 February 2009, http://www.bbc.co.uk).   
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with lower social entitlements typically have a lower reservation wage.  The primary objective of 
working class organizations in the economic conflict against employers is to ensure a greater surplus 
for workers, i.e., a higher premium over the reservation wage.  Yet, the same wage rate implies 
differential premiums for workers across identity divides when such divides overlap due to historical 
reasons with present differences in reservation wage.   
The purpose of this paper is therefore to examine how ethnicity or religion-specific 
differences in reservation wage, interpreted as the consequence of historically generated asymmetries 
in social entitlements, impact distribution via the joint determination of class conflict between the 
working class and the employing class, and „ethnic‟ conflict (i.e., distributive conflict along such 
identity divides) within the working class.  Does prior inequality in social entitlements within the 
working class end up harming even its privileged section?  Would higher returns from engaging in 
class conflict reduce ethnic conflict or benefit all workers?  Can „trade-union politics‟, i.e. articulation 
of shared economic interests in contesting the employing class, suffice as an incentive for rational 
workers to abjure intra-class warfare?  These are the questions we address.
4
 
The connection between identity divides and asymmetries in social entitlements (and thus 
reservation wage) among different segments of workers that we highlight arises in many different 
contexts.  Jewish workers in Europe in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, Arab workers in Israel, Black 
workers in apartheid South Africa, Black workers in Jim Crow US, lower-caste workers in India, all 
provide obvious examples of segments systematically denied access to residential neighbourhoods 
and valuable public facilities, including security, that are available to other segments of the working 
class.
5
  In many developing societies, customary rights to rural common property resources such as 
forests, rivers, ponds, grazing land, and sometimes even small plots for subsistence agriculture are 
contingent on being born into specific ethnic or religious groups.  In most countries, large sections of 
immigrant workers face legal restrictions on accessing health, welfare and educational facilities 
relative to the native-born.  Furthermore, ethnic and religious communities often develop their own 
support institutions which largely, or even entirely, exclude other communities.  Thus, workers from 
communities with weaker internal support institutions find themselves with lower social entitlements. 
 There is a second sense in which differences in community origin may generate differences in 
social entitlements.  Modern large-scale production develops by absorbing, as workers, individuals 
from traditional forms of employment in subsistence agriculture, artisanal production, petty trade and 
                                                 
4  Roemer et al. (2007) have shown how ethnic divisions may lead to electoral equilibria which restrain 
redistribution.  We focus instead on non-electoral conflict equilibria.  Thus, our contribution is rooted in the 
literature on conflict and rent-seeking contests (see Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2007, for a survey).  In this 
literature, Katz and Tokatlidu (1996) and Glazer (2002) analyse aspects of internal vs. external rent seeking.  
While sharing a structural analogy, our specific focus is different.  Dasgupta and Kanbur (2007, 2005a) examine 
the mediation of ethnic and class conflicts through voluntary contribution to public goods that are valued 
independently of income consequences.  We complement their analysis by abstracting from such public goods.  
5
  See Dasgupta and Kanbur (2005b) for an expanded discussion of how community origin may 
influence access to public goods.   
Page 4 of 27
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 3 
services.
6
  Different ethnic or religious groups have often specialized in specific niche occupations in 
pre-modern societies.  Entry into these occupations was regulated by a mix of custom, traditional law 
and competitive advantage due to inter-generational transmission of information and training 
exclusively within the community.  Thus, in developing societies today, it is not unusual to find 
different traditional occupations generating different earnings, yet being largely dominated by 
particular identity groups.  The modern industrial economy expands in these societies by drawing in, 
as similarly paid workers, individuals whose earning opportunities in the residual, traditional/informal 
sector can vary greatly depending on their ethnic location.
7
 
While conflict between workers and employers has various dimensions, we focus on such 
conflict over the scope and implementation of a given, legislatively sanctioned „social/living wage‟.  
While the notion of „social entitlement‟ involves the rights of individuals to a quantum of resources 
purely by virtue of their membership in some community, that of a „social‟ wage involves a collective 
recognition of an individual‟s right to a quantum of resources merely on account of her willingness to 
accept employment.  Minimum wage laws constitute the obvious example of social regulation of the 
employment relationship.  But the notion of a social wage also includes regulation of other aspects 
such as workers‟ health and safety, hours of work, leave and childcare facilities, minimum age of 
employment etc.  Together, such labour regulations aim to put a composite floor on an individual‟s 
return from employment, above what an uncontrolled labour market might typically provide.  This 
composite floor, the social wage, thus generates a rent, which is contested by workers and employers.  
While unions seek to enforce and expand the scope of the social wage, employers attempt to restrict 
or evade it, whether illegally or by utilizing loopholes and ambiguities in legislation.  Much of the 
day-to-day conflict between employers and unions takes the form of such contestation.  It is this 
aspect of the class conflict, and its relation to ethnic conflicts among workers over sharing of the 
associated rent accruing to the working class as a whole, which we analyze. 
We model a two-dimensional contest, where two agents (unions), representing different 
sections of workers, jointly but non-cooperatively invest resources against employers in acquiring a 
share of an exogenously given rent, or surplus.  This surplus arises from an exogenously determined 
social wage, set above workers‟ reservation wage rates.  Employers seek to evade the social wage and 
pay workers their reservation wage, whereas the unions attempt to defend (i.e. enforce) it.  The two 
sections of workers, interpreted as two different identity groups, differ in terms of their reservation 
wage.  The two unions also invest resources in a simultaneous contest against one another that 
determines how the surplus accruing to the working class is divided between its constituent sections.  
                                                 
6
  As in the classical two-sector model of economic development due to Lewis (1954).   
7
  In India, for example, caste and religious groups typically continue to dominate in their respective 
traditional occupations, generating systematic differences in earnings across communities.  See, for example, 
Harris-White (2003).  Ethnic niches are not absent even in the modern sector, and capitalists may find it rational 
to wage discriminate among workers belonging to different ethnic groups (e.g. Roemer, 1979).  Our interest 
however lies in analyzing ethnic conflicts among workers even when they are treated identically by capitalists. 
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An agent representing employers chooses their resource expenditure on evading the social wage, 
taking into account the equilibrium defensive responses of the two unions.  Thus, ethnic conflict 
within the working class and class conflict between workers and employers jointly determine the 
distribution of the surplus among employers and the two constituent sections of the working class.   
We first show that the union representing „advanced‟ workers, i.e., workers with high 
reservation wage, may concentrate exclusively on ethnic contestation against other workers, choosing 
to leave class contestation entirely to the union representing „backward‟ workers, i.e. workers with 
low reservation wage.  The latter participates in both ethnic and class warfare.  We then show hat a 
rise in the reservation wage of backward workers also benefits advanced workers, while hurting 
employers.  Such a rise reduces the incentive for the backward section to invest in either class or 
ethnic conflict, thereby increasing both employer evasion and the share of the advanced section.  For 
advanced workers, the second (ethnic) effect necessarily dominates the first (class) effect, so that this 
section benefits overall.  For employers, lower gain from successful evasion outweighs the benefits 
from greater evasion, so that their income falls overall.  A rise in the social wage, while aggravating 
both class and ethnic conflicts, benefits only the advanced section of the working class, making the 
backward section and employers both worse off.  These comparative static conclusions regarding 
conflict and distribution hold even when backward workers do not compete with advanced workers in 
large sectors of the labour market, say due to discrimination, legal restrictions, or small numbers.    
Our exploration suggests that advanced workers may, indirectly, benefit from improved social 
entitlements for backward workers.  Thus, we provide micro-foundations for an argument of class 
solidarity between advanced and backward workers, grounded in an „enlightened‟ (i.e. general 
equilibrium) conception of self interest.  However, our analysis also suggests that such an argument 
may be difficult to extend beyond the sphere of social entitlements to that of „labour rights‟.  
Specifically, our results suggest that working class (say minority or immigrant) communities with 
weak entitlements may share an interest, with employers and against workers from privileged 
communities, in keeping labour regulations (and thus the social wage) relatively low.  Affirmative 
action programs that seek to open up larger sections of the labour market to workers from 
marginalized ethnic, racial or religious communities may pit such groups against workers from the 
dominant community, benefiting employers.  Thus, when ethnic minority or immigrant workers are 
initially marginalized both in the labour market and in access to non-wage entitlements, improving job 
access (say, through positive discriminatory job quotas) and expanding „social enfranchisement‟ (say, 
through improved housing, health, child-support and unemployment benefits) for such workers may 
have contradictory effects on class and ethnic conflicts.  Lastly, our analysis suggests that the politics 
of „trade unionism‟, i.e. articulation of shared objective economic interests alone, may prove 
insufficient to control ethnic conflicts within the working class.  A working class politics that also 
ventures into the provisioning of class-cultural public goods, i.e. of non-economic forms of shared 
identity articulation specific to the working class as a whole, may have better prospects.      
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 Section 2 develops the benchmark model.  The main results regarding conflict and 
distribution are presented in Section 3.  Section 4 discusses various possible extensions and 
amendments to our benchmark model.  Section 5 summarizes and concludes.   
 
2.  The model 
Consider a society with two classes: employers (R) and workers (K).  R controls access to a 
productive asset, say land or capital.  This productive asset, when combined with one unit of labour, 
yields revenue W .  K is endowed with two units of labour, but R does not own any labour.  Hence, R 
needs to employ half of K‟s labour endowment to generate the (gross) revenue W ; it retains the 
surplus left after wage payments.  K is equally divided into „advanced‟ (M) and „backward‟ (B) 
sections, distinguished by different reservation wage rates, respectively, Mw  and Bw ; 
0BM wwW .  We interpret these two sections as different identity (ethnic or religious) 
groups.  Workers can be hired at some „social‟ (exogenously mandated, and thus non-market clearing) 
wage rate WwW M , .  This social wage rate is however „contested‟, in that employers attempt to 
attack (evade) it by hiring only B workers and paying them Bw , whereas workers seek to defend 
(enforce) the social wage.
8
  The extent of implementation of the social wage is thus determined as the 
outcome of class conflict between workers and employers.  
 To fix ideas, we think of the social wage as a legislatively mandated „minimum‟ or „living‟ 
wage, along with a package of mandated workers‟ benefits or „protection‟ (e.g. pensions, severance 
payments, workplace voice and control, health and safety regulations, leave and childcare facilities, 
limitations on hours, intensity and forms of work, seniority and overtime rules, minimum age of 
employment, etc.).  Typically, in practice, the social wage comes about as the legislative outcome of a 
complex and evolving process of society-wide political conflict and negotiation among 
representatives of workers, capitalists and others, including, historically, the landed gentry.
9
  These 
conflicts and negotiations may also have trans-national dimensions, in that international agreements 
often impose social wage conditions on participating countries.
10
  Once determined, the social wage 
generates a rent, which is contested by workers and employers.  It is this subsequent contestation that 
we wish to conceptually isolate and analyze.  Such contestation can take both legal and extra-legal 
forms.  Laws leave loopholes, grey areas and interpretative ambiguities that are fought over in courts 
                                                 
8
  Incentive considerations abstracted from in our analysis may induce employers to offer an efficiency 
wage, say 
e
Bw , above the backward reservation wage in case of successful evasion.  So long as 
e
BM ww , this 
does not significantly change our substantive conclusions, though it complicates the algebra. 
9
  Conservative foundations for the welfare state were laid down in the 19
th
 century by Disraeli in 
Britain and Bismarck in Germany.  Support or opposition from groups representing the peasantry, urban 
intellectuals, and the intermediate strata consisting mainly of petty traders, artisans and shopkeepers played a 
key role in the legislative evolution of labour regulations in most countries in the 20
th
 century.     
10
  The European Union imposes a set of labour regulations on all member countries.  International 
trade, aid and investment agreements often include clauses regarding „fair‟ labour standards/practices. 
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by representatives of employers and unions.  Employers may also resort to illegal violation of labour 
regulations.
11
  Contestation can involve litigation, lobbying, bribing of judges, regulators and 
politicians, strike making and strike breaking activities (including the strategic use of violence), etc.   
 In the context of developing countries, one can site the social wage in the so-called formal (or 
modern, large-scale industrial) sector.  Unions are, by and large, confined to this sector; minimum 
wage laws and other labour regulations also usually pertain only to this sector.     
 Each section of K is represented by its own union.  The two unions, M and B, non-
cooperatively spend resources, respectively BM hh , , to defend the social wage.  Employers‟ spending 
on attacks on the social wage is Rh .  We identify the extent of class conflict with overall expenditure 
on contestation over the social wage: RBM hhhh .  If class conflict occurs ( 0h ), the 
proportion of workers hired who receive W (working class success in the class conflict) is given by 
the Tullock (1967, 1980) contest success function 
h
hh BM .  The proportion of workers hired who 
receive Bw  is thus 
h
hR .  In the absence of class conflict ( 0h ), this proportion is 
2
1
.  
 There are different ways of interpreting our formulation of working class representation.  One 
can visualize this in terms of separate and openly competing organizations divided along ethnic, 
religious or linguistic lines.  One can also interpret it in terms of internally cohesive identity factions 
or even organizationally recognized sub-sections within a nominally united workers‟ organization.12  
The key idea that we seek to capture is that coordination costs of engaging in collective action are 
significantly lower within an identity group than across identity groups inside the working class.  
Class conflict involves attempts to ensure that all workers employed receive the social wage.  Such 
attempts leave open the issue of how the consequent high (social) wage jobs will be rationed.  This 
involves a second, „ethnic‟ dimension to distributive conflict, which we now formally model. 13 
                                                 
11
  For example, Indian firms with fewer than ten workers are not subject to labour regulations, while 
most large firms maintain a substantial casual labour force that is undeclared and thus free from regulation.  The 
government is currently proposing to restrict the scope of labour regulations further, to firms employing more 
than forty workers.  Violation of labour regulations is routine in developing countries.  See Dasgupta and Marjit 
(2006) for a discussion and a model of class conflict in such a setting.  A recent British Trades Union Congress 
Report on Vulnerable Employment claims that more than two million people in Britain endure 19
th
 century 
workplace practices, including payments below the minimum wage, absence of paid holiday or sickness leave, 
exceptionally long hours, and no compensation for workplace injuries.  The report argues much exploitative 
treatment occurs because of legal loopholes that employers utilize (Trades Union Congress, 2008).  The Report 
itself provides an example of expenditure by trade unions to contest and restrict such loopholes.  Ehrenreich 
(2001) documents similar practices in the US, where union-busting constitutes a multi-billion dollar industry. 
12
  In India, for example, central trade unions affiliated to the national political parties contain caste, 
religion or region-specific internal lobbies; a multitude of independent trade unions also exist which explicitly 
seek to represent workers from particular communities.  Ethnic sub-sections formed the organizational building 
blocks of the trade union movement in the Austro-Hungarian empire, as well as late 19
th
 - early 20
th
 century US.   
13
  If a union restricts enforcement merely to its own members, then it faces the danger of being 
undercut by wage competition from the other union.  Unions can enforce a higher wage only if they can prevent 
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Each union seeks to ensure a greater share of available social wage jobs for its own section of 
the working class.  Expenditures on such „ethnic‟ contestation are denoted by Mg , Bg .  We identify 
the extent of ethnic conflict with overall expenditure on contestation over the social wage within the 
working class: BM ggg .  Success in ethnic conflict is determined by relative expenditure: the 
share of social wage jobs that accrues to M is 
g
g M  if 0g , and 
2
1
 otherwise.
14
 
Intuitively, we think of ethnic conflict within the working class, like class conflict, as having 
both legal-legislative and extra-legal manifestations.  Ethnic conflict can involve the strategic use of 
violence against workers of a different identity group.  Violence, intimidation, strike action and 
organization of consumer boycotts can also be used against employers to induce them to offer a 
greater share of available high (social) wage jobs to workers from a particular identity group.  Unions 
may lobby legislatures to pass or tighten laws restricting or enhancing access to social wage jobs for 
specific ethnic groups, through, say, ethnic hiring quotas, language requirements, immigration and 
residential restrictions, selective or preferential provision of job information, etc.  All these activities 
necessitate the expenditure of resources: thus, for our purposes, they are treated as a composite whole. 
Let MMBB wWwW , , 
M
B
; then  measures B‟s gain from social wage 
employment relative to M‟s.  Let j  denote the payoff (income) of agent RBMjj ,,; .   
BBB
BMB
BB whg
g
g
h
hh
;                                                                         (1) 
MMM
MMB
MM whg
g
g
h
hh
;                                                                   (2) 
WWh
h
h
R
R
BR
.                                                                                            (3) 
                                                                                                                                                        
members and non-members alike from accepting lower wages.  Thus, enforcement presupposes universal 
coverage.  Conversely, enforcement failure implies the wage rate being driven down to the reservation level via 
competition among workers.  Unions in practice typically oppose restricting the coverage of wage and 
workplace agreements to their own members when (as in our case) they cannot automatically ensure a „closed 
shop‟, i.e., exclusive employment for members.  Universal coverage however generates a free-rider problem.  
Unions therefore simultaneously seek closed shops, i.e., they attempt to exclude non-members from 
employment: such attempts bring about inter-union conflict.  It is this interaction between enforcement and 
exclusion that we analyze via their joint determination in our model.  While the literature has widely noted the 
free-rider problem in the context of individual unions, our intuitive entry-point is its exacerbation across 
ethnic/religious boundaries.  The assumption that union contributions to class conflict are perfect substitutes, 
while intuitively appealing, is made essentially for algebraic simplicity.  Section 4 discusses how structural (i.e. 
exogenous) aspects to exclusion, and differential effectiveness in conflict, affect our benchmark model.       
14
  Skaperdas (1996) axiomatizes a generalized Tullock contest function.  Our substantive conclusions 
will remain unchanged under his more general specification of the conflict technology (see Section 4.3 below).  
Assuming risk neutrality, contest success can also be interpreted in probabilistic terms, instead of job shares. 
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R first decides how much resource to allocate to attacking the social wage, i.e., the size of Rh .  The 
two unions subsequently, and simultaneously, decide how much resource to allocate to class and 
ethnic conflicts.  Thus, the interaction between unions M and B is modelled as a Cournot game where 
the union BMj ,  chooses its pair of conflict allocations 
jj hg , , given the prior employing 
class conflict allocation Rh .  This Cournot game is embedded within a framework of Stackelberg 
interaction between the employing class and the working class as a whole, with the former acting as 
the Stackelberg leader.
15
  In standard fashion, we shall solve this game via backward induction.
16
 
 Consider therefore first the interaction between the two unions, facing a predetermined social 
wage rate (W) and employers‟ conflict allocation ( Rh ).  For BMj , , the decision problem is: 
jj gh
Max
,
jjj
jMB
jj whg
g
g
h
hh
. 
In equilibrium, it must be the case that: 
01
2g
g
h
hh
g
MMB
B
B
B ,                                                                                   (4) 
01
2 g
g
h
h
h
BR
B
B
B ,                                                                                              (5) 
 01
2g
g
h
hh
g
BMB
M
M
M ,                                                                                  (6) 
01
2 g
g
h
h
h
MR
M
M
M .                                                                                           (7) 
 
Proposition 1.  In any Nash equilibrium, 0,, BMB ggh , and 0Mh . 
Proof:  See the Appendix. 
 
By Proposition 1, in a Nash equilibrium, only backward workers will contribute resources to 
defending the social wage.  The advanced section will concentrate exclusively on ethnic contestation 
                                                 
15
  Recall that the social wage rate is a prior in our analysis.  Facing this predetermined wage rate, 
employers decide the extent of evasion.  Thus, evasion involves employers making the first move.  It would 
seem strange indeed if rational employers did not factor in the consequent responses of workers when choosing 
their prior allocation of resources to evasion.  In practice, employers often hire professional union-busting 
consultants, lawyers, security personnel etc., whose explicit responsibility it is to predict and pre-empt union 
responses to employer evasion of labour regulations.  It thus seems natural to model R as the Stackelberg leader.   
16
  Katz and Tokatlidu (1996) model a general rent-seeking contest in two stages, where two internally 
homogeneous groups Cournot-contest a given rent in the first stage, and (identical) members of the winning 
group engage in mutual contestation in the subsequent stage.  Our formulation, in terms of a Stackelberg leader 
contesting a group with two dissimilar members, who simultaneously engage in contesting the leader as well as 
one another, is quite different.  Second, while Katz and Tokatlidu (1996) focus on how group size affects rent-
seeking expenditure, we examine how differences in reservation wage impact on conflict and distribution. 
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against other workers for a share of available social wage jobs.  Thus, both sections of the working 
class will engage in ethnic contestation, but the advanced section will free-ride on the backward 
section in the sphere of class contestation.  This occurs essentially because the rent from employment 
at the social wage is lower for advanced workers.  For M to contribute to the class conflict, it must 
therefore be ensured a higher share of available social wage jobs.  However, precisely because the net 
benefit from the social wage is higher for backward workers, the backward section will spend more on 
ethnic contestation, thereby ensuring a higher share for itself.  Their weakness in ethnic contestation, 
itself a consequence of their privileged position (in terms of a higher reservation wage), will make the 
advanced workers unwilling to engage in class contestation against employers.
17
     
 We now proceed to characterize the Nash equilibrium.  Recall that 1
M
B
.  Suppose an 
equilibrium exists.  Then, from (4) and (6), in light of Proposition 1, we have MB gg , and thus, 
1Mgg .  Solving (4) and (6), we consequently get:  
1
1
h
h
g BB ,                                                                                                            (8) 
 
2
1
1
h
h
g BBM ,                                                                                                     (9) 
 
2
1h
h
g BBB .                                                                                                   (10) 
Now, using (5), (8) and (10), and noting Proposition 1, we get [ h
h
hR
B
1
],                                                                                                 
so that, given any Rh , a Nash equilibrium must satisfy: 
2
12
1
1
R
B
R h
h
h
.                                                                                                              (11) 
Equation (11) represents the reaction function of the working class as a whole (K) faced by R.  R 
chooses its optimal conflict expenditure taking into account the response of K, as summarized by (11).  
Using (3) and (11), and assuming a Nash equilibrium exists, R‟s optimization problem is, therefore: 
                                                 
17
  To offer a suggestive illustration, the labour upsurge in the US in the 1890s was halted partly by the 
rise of anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant sentiments, led by the American Protective Association (a 
predominantly Scotch-Irish group) and the United American Mechanics.  “Protestants were warned to avoid all 
unions dominated by papists, to discard the strike as a useless device, and to place no confidence in free silver.  
…  In the coalfields of Pennsylvania and Illinois this internecine strife checked a UMW organizing drive; in 
many cases it tore existing locals apart” (Higham, 1974: p.82).  One may perhaps also read a reflection in the 
disproportionately large support for socialist parties in the early 20
th
 century among Protestants in France, 
among Finns in the Tsarist empire, and among Jews in many European countries (Hobsbawm 1987: p.139).     
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2
12
1
1
RBR
h
hMax
R
WWhR .                                                                (12) 
The first order condition yields the Nash equilibrium conflict expenditure of R: 
1
4
B
Rh

.                                                                                                              (13) 
Using (11) and (13), and recalling Proposition 1, we get the equilibrium measure of class conflict as 
well as working class contribution to it:  
2
Bh

;                                                                                                                                (14) 
Bh
 1
4
B .                                                                                                                 (15) 
Notice that, by (14), class conflict does not exhaust the surplus ( B ).  Together, (8)-(10) and (13)-
(15) yield the equilibrium measure of ethnic conflict and its sectional contributions: 
1
1
2
Bg

;                                                                                                             (16)                                                                      
 
2
1
1
2
B
Bg

;                                                                                                          (17) 
2
1
1
2
B
M
g

.                                                                                                      (18) 
In light of Proposition 1, equations (13)-(15), (17) and (18) together completely characterize a Nash 
equilibrium if it exists.  Evidently, the Nash equilibrium must be unique if it exists.  
Notice that, from (14)-(15), we get the measure of equilibrium working class success in the 
class conflict, i.e. the proportion of workers hired who actually receive the social wage: 
2
1
,0
2
1
h
hB

.                                                                                                        (19) 
Analogously, from (16)-(17), we get the measure of the success of the backward section of the 
working class in ethnic conflict, i.e., its share of total social wage employment: 
  1,
2
1
1g
g B

.                                                                                                        (20) 
By (20), the backward section is more successful in ethnic conflict than the advanced section.  As 
discussed earlier, this is due to its rent from the social wage being higher.  In turn, this outcome leads 
to the privileged section of workers withdrawing from the class conflict, as noted in Proposition 1. 
Lastly, in light of (1)-(3), (13) and (15)-(18), equilibrium payoffs (incomes) are given by: 
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WWBR
1
4

;                                                                                             (21) 
M
B
M w22 12
1
;                                                                                                     (22) 
B
B
B w2
2
14
1]21[
.                                                                                     (23) 
Now, (23) implies BB w

 iff 0]21[
2
.  Since B can always ensure Bw  by choosing 
0BB gh , (15) and (17) cannot constitute B‟s best response if 0]21[
2
.  However, by 
Proposition 1, (15) and (17) must necessarily hold in a Nash equilibrium.  Thus, an equilibrium exists 
iff 0]21[
2
.  We shall assume the inequality holds strictly, i.e., we shall assume: 
A1.  0]21[
2
. 
A1 ensures the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.  A1 must hold when  is 
sufficiently large, i.e., when the advanced reservation wage is sufficiently higher than that of the 
backward segment.  Thus, A1 implies 2 , furthermore, A1 is necessarily satisfied when 5.2 .  
Note that, by (21)-(23), and given A1, M, B and R are all strictly better off by contesting. 
 
3.  Conflict and distribution 
We are now ready to specify how changes in reservation wage rates and the social wage impact on 
class and ethnic conflicts, and, thereby, distribution, in our benchmark model. 
 
Proposition 2.  Let A1 hold.  
(i) A rise in the advanced reservation wage improves the success of the working class in the 
class conflict, while reducing ethnic conflict within the working class.  The backward section is more 
successful in the ethnic conflict.  Class conflict is unchanged.   
(ii) A rise in the backward reservation wage reduces the success of the working class in the class 
conflict, while also reducing ethnic conflict within the working class.  The backward section is less 
successful in the ethnic conflict.  Class conflict falls.  
Proof:  See the Appendix. 
 
A rise in the reservation wage of advanced workers reduces their rent from social wage jobs, thereby 
reducing their incentive to engage in appropriative activities against the backward section.  This 
directly reduces aggregate expenditure on ethnic conflict.  However, this relative withdrawal of the 
advanced section from ethnic contestation also induces the backward section to invest greater 
resources in defending the social wage.  Consequently, employers‟ success in evading the social wage 
is reduced.  This in turn elicits greater conflict within the working class.  The direct effect 
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nevertheless dominates, so that ethnic conflict falls overall (Proposition 2(i)).  Thus, greater inequality 
in non-market entitlements serves to strengthen the working class in its conflict with employers, while 
also increasing the share of backward workers in social wage jobs and reducing distributive tensions 
among workers.  A rise in the reservation wage of backward workers reduces their net benefit from 
defending the social wage, inducing them to withdraw from both class and ethnic contestation.  Such 
a rise also reduces the net benefit to employers from evading the social wage, leading to a fall in class 
conflict.  The overall impact nevertheless is greater employer evasion of the social wage.  The 
withdrawal of the backward section from ethnic conflict provides greater incentive to the advanced 
section to engage in ethnic contestation, but the former‟s withdrawal from the class conflict reduces 
such incentive.  The net effect is both a fall in ethnic conflict and a relative strengthening of the 
advanced section.  Thus, Proposition 2(ii) implies that an improvement in social entitlements for 
backward workers leads to greater evasion of the social wage and lower representation of backward 
workers in high wage jobs, though it mitigates both class conflict and ethnic conflict.    
 
Remark 1.  Total conflict expenditure gh  can be viewed as a measure of aggregate conflict.  By 
Proposition 2, a rise in the reservation wage of either section of workers reduces aggregate conflict. 
 
 Proposition 2 characterizes how changes in reservation wages simultaneously impact on class 
and ethnic conflicts.  We now proceed to specify their distributive consequences. 
 
Proposition 3.  Let A1 hold.  Then, a rise in the reservation wage of either section of the working 
class makes the other section better off, and the employing class worse off. 
Proof:  See the Appendix. 
 
By Proposition 2(i), higher reservation wage for advanced workers induces them to withdraw from 
ethnic contestation, thereby incentivising the backward section to invest more in the class conflict.  
Proposition 3 implies this offensive ensures greater surplus for the backward section, correspondingly 
reducing the income of the employing class.  Conversely, a rise in the reservation wage of the 
backward section induces it to withdraw from both class and ethnic contestation (Proposition 2(ii)).  
The first (class) effect impacts the advanced section adversely; the second (ethnic) effect impacts it 
positively.  Proposition 3 implies the ethnic effect dominates.  Despite greater evasion, employers are 
worse off, since the rise in the backward reservation wage also reduces their gain from evasion.   
 By Proposition 3, an improvement in social entitlements for any section of workers, mediated 
through general equilibrium channels of class and ethnic contestation, also ends up benefiting the 
other section (while hurting employers).  This suggests it may be in the objective economic interest of 
one section of the working class to support greater social entitlements for another.  Notions of class 
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solidarity may in this specific sense be objectively grounded in an „enlightened‟ (i.e. general 
equilibrium) understanding of self interest, and advanced workers‟ opposition to greater social 
entitlements (say, in housing, education and health) for backward (say minority or immigrant) 
workers may perhaps be ascribed to „false consciousness‟, „racial prejudice‟ or employer propaganda.   
 However, the commonality of interest among workers in the sphere of social entitlement does 
not extend to the sphere of the social wage, as we now show. 
 
Proposition 4.  Let A1 hold.  Then, a rise in the social wage reduces the success of the working class 
in the class conflict, while increasing both ethnic and class conflict.  The backward section is less 
successful in the ethnic conflict.  Advanced workers are better off, while both employers and 
backward workers are worse off.   
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
A rise in the social wage, by increasing the prize, intensifies both class and ethnic conflict.  Such a 
rise induces the advanced section to commit greater resources against the backward section, thereby 
reducing the latter‟s share of high wage jobs.  This loss, in turn, weakens working class defence of the 
social wage, thereby inducing greater evasion by employers.  Thus, Proposition 4 implies a rise in the 
social wage generates an offensive by both employers and advanced workers against backward 
workers.  For the backward section, the negative impact of greater employer evasion and lower share 
outweighs the positive impact of the rise.
18
  Employers benefit from greater evasion, but achieve a 
lower surplus in case of successful working class defence. By Proposition 4, the second effect 
dominates.  For advanced workers, greater success in ethnic contestation outweighs greater evasion by 
employers.  Thus, advanced workers are the only beneficiaries of a higher social wage.   
 In sum, Propositions 2, 3 and 4 together suggest that, while backward workers may share an 
interest with advanced workers against employers in improving their social entitlements, they may 
also share an interest with employers against advanced workers in keeping the social wage low. 
By Proposition 4, the optimal social wage from the backward workers‟ perspective is Mw .  
Ethnic conflict is eliminated when the social wage is in the interval ],[ MB ww : B workers monopolize 
social wage employment, and (consequently) enforcement attains its peak at Mw ; M workers get their 
reservation wage.  Note now that the competitive wage rate is Bw .  This suggests that, from an initial 
situation of competitive wage determination, „living wage‟ campaigns are likely to be initiated by 
backward workers.
19
  Advanced workers will be largely indifferent to such campaigns until the social 
                                                 
18
  Glazer (2002) shows that the owner of a firm may be better off hiring a less productive worker, if 
she also happens to be less efficient in stealing from the owner.  Our result, that backward workers are better off 
with a lower social wage, since this reduces „stealing‟ by the advanced section, has a similar flavour.  
19
  Low-paid sweatshop industry and service sector Latino workers reinvigorated a moribund, White-
dominated union movement in Los Angeles in the 1990s.  Starting with the janitors‟ strike of 1990, a number of 
Page 15 of 27
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 14 
wage is sufficiently high.  Once the social wage exceeds the advanced reservation wage, however, 
advanced workers may start supplanting backward workers as the driving force behind campaigns for 
further increase, while the latter start withdrawing from (indeed, even opposing) such campaigns.      
 
4.  Extensions 
We now proceed to discuss various extensions to the benchmark model developed in Sections 2-3. 
 
4.1.  Partially contestable labour markets 
In our model, we have assumed that the entire social wage employment is open to contestation by 
both sections of workers.  In practice, it may be that different segments of the working class can 
directly compete with one another only in parts of the social wage labour market.  For example, 
immigrant workers are often legally barred from applying for particular types of jobs, or kept beyond 
the pale of labour regulations.  Affirmative action programs often take the form of hiring quotas for 
particular sections of workers, as in the case of caste-based reservations in India.  One section of the 
working class may also be too small numerically to meet the entire labour demand at the social wage.  
Residential segregation, social discrimination or legal restrictions on travel and relocation may 
confine workers of a particular ethnicity to geographic pockets, so that they are unable to take up jobs 
too far outside those pockets.  One can capture these situations of „structural exclusion‟ in terms of 
some proportion, say 1,0q , of available (i.e. enforced) social wage jobs being contested over by 
the two groups of workers, with the remaining proportion q1  occupied exclusively by one group. 
 The conclusions presented earlier do not change if the backward section of workers can 
access a relatively high proportion of available social wage jobs (i.e., if either q  is close to 1 or the 
proportion q1  is reserved for backward workers).  However, if a sufficiently large proportion 
q1  is reserved for advanced workers, so that the share of the labour market open to 
competition/contestation by backward workers, q , is sufficiently small, backward workers would 
withdraw completely from lass contestation.  The roles noted in Proposition 1 now get reversed, in 
that working class defence of the social wage is now carried out exclusively by advanced workers, 
                                                                                                                                                        
militant industrial actions by primarily Latino rank and file workers over the decade culminated in LA labour‟s 
“big-bang” in 1999-2000.  In the largest single membership break-through since the 1930s, 74,000 LA County 
homecare workers, primarily Mexican and Central American immigrants, voted for union representation in 
1999.  The Latino labour uprising in Los Angeles “… cemented a multi-ethnic coalition around the campaign 
for a metropolitan living wage.  In 1997, the Los Angeles City Council … defied Mayor Riordan to join a dozen 
other cities in passing a „living wage‟ ordinance for workers under city contract” (Davis, 2001: p. 174).  
Directed by Ken Loach, the film “Bread and Roses” (2000) provides a sensitive and insightful portrayal of the 
struggles of LA janitors for a living wage and union recognition. 
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while both sections of workers continue to take part in ethnic contestation.
20
  This is a consequence of 
the fact that, as q  diminishes, the backward section‟s marginal benefit from class contestation falls, 
while that of the advanced section rises.  A rise in the reservation wage of the backward section now 
comes to strengthen working class defence of the social wage, instead of weakening it (recall 
Proposition 2).  Conversely, a rise in the reservation wage of the advanced section weakens working 
class defence of the social wage, instead of strengthening it.  Thus, greater equality within the 
working class, in the sense of greater social entitlements for its backward section, serves to improve 
its success in the common conflict against employers only when the backward section is highly 
marginalized in terms of access to social wage jobs.  As earlier (Proposition 3), a rise in the backward 
reservation wage benefits the advanced section, while hurting the employing class.  Interestingly, 
however, a rise in the advanced reservation wage now comes to also benefit employers, by permitting 
greater evasion of the social wage.  A rise in the social wage continues to increase the share of 
advanced workers in high wage jobs, as well as both class and ethnic conflict (as in Proposition 4).  
However, such a rise now comes to reduce employer evasion of the social wage.  Employers thus 
doubly lose, while advanced workers doubly gain.  Backward workers lose if the negative ethnic 
effect (lower share) outweighs the positive class effect (stronger enforcement).    
Notice that improving access to employment on part of the backward section (formally, a 
marginal rise in q from some initial value close to 0) leads to an aggravation of ethnic conflict, a 
relative withdrawal of the advanced section from the class conflict, and a consequent increase in 
employer evasion.
21
  As noted earlier, once q  crosses a critical threshold, the backward section comes 
                                                 
20
  Formally, B now maximizes BBB
BMB
BB whg
g
g
h
hh
q , while M 
maximizes MMM
MMB
MM whgq
g
g
q
h
hh
1 .  Since, in case of successful 
evasion, R is always better off by hiring a backward worker, R‟s objective function remains unchanged.  
21
 US labour history serves to illustrate.  At the beginning of WWII, Blacks had been excluded from 
defence jobs.  After the „March on Washington Movement‟ in 1941 by Black unionists, Roosevelt signed an 
executive order against job discrimination.  Subsequently, Black workers obtained footholds in aircraft, vehicle 
assembly and ship-building.  Between March and June 1943, over 100,000 man-days were lost in „hate-strikes‟ 
by whites against the upgrading of Black workers.  One of the largest occurred at the Packard Works in Detroit 
during April 1943, when 25,000 whites struck in retaliation for a brief sit-down of Blacks protesting their not 
being promoted.  Two months later, Detroit erupted into anti-Black pogroms that took thirty-four lives 
(Cochran, 1977: pp. 221-223).  In 1945, United Auto Workers leader Richard Frankensteen‟s predicted victory 
in his bid for the mayoralty of Detroit was denied by the defection of white auto workers protesting the CIO‟s 
endorsement of the federal Fair Employment Practices Committee.  The next year, „Operation Dixie‟ – the 
CIO‟s ambitious Southern organizing campaign, collapsed in the midst of racial conflict within the movement.  
After the 1955 reunification of the AFL and the CIO, the trade union leadership, in general, continued to exhibit 
“… benign neglect, if not overt racism, towards the plight of Black and Hispanic workers.  …  (A)t the height of 
the anti-war and Black-power movements in 1968-70, the old-line craft unions, along with their allies in the 
Mafia-controlled teamsters and maritime unions, wrecked any hope of a New Deal-type social alliance by … 
opposing schemes for Black control of local institutions (like the police or schools), rejecting demands for 
affirmative action in apprenticeship programs, and, in a majority of cases, aligning with the urban-Democratic 
anciens regimes against ghetto and campus demands, even frequently against newly unionized public-sector 
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to replace the advanced section in the common conflict against employers.  Then, further 
improvements in labour market access for the backward section (i.e. further rises in q ) strengthen 
defence of the social wage, whereas improvements in their social entitlements weaken such defence. 
4.2.  Conflict financing    
We have assumed that workers are not resource constrained, in that both sections can indeed allocate 
their optimal choice of resources to redistributive activities.  This neither presupposes that an ethnic 
group can deploy an unlimited amount to redistributive endeavours, nor that the two groups have 
symmetric access to resources.  First recall that both groups are better off, in equilibrium, by engaging 
in conflict: conflict expenditure is less than the consequent gain.  Thus, our formulation is implied by 
a profitability criterion regarding each group‟s ability to spend on conflict (an expenditure level is 
feasible if it generates a surplus).  The profitability criterion is compatible with differential upper 
bounds on ability to spend.  Indeed, it is compatible with a lower expenditure ceiling for backward 
workers: advanced workers may find it optimal to spend less on conflict than backward workers, 
despite their ability to spend more, simply because the former have less to gain from social wage jobs. 
 Is the profitability criterion, which implies resources are necessarily forthcoming for 
redistributive activities that generate a surplus, empirically plausible?  The presence of the surplus 
generates the scope for mutually beneficial exchange.  Provided repayment can be ensured, outside 
financiers can be better off by, in effect, lending resources on demand to political entrepreneurs 
representing either section of the working class.  Such external financiers are indeed often available.  
Arguably, the infiltration of sections of the labour movement in the US and many other countries by 
organized crime syndicates reflects this process.  Analogously, unions often affiliate themselves to 
larger entities such as political parties and national (even transnational) syndicates.  Such external 
entities provide start-up resources, in exchange for promises of future material and electoral 
repayment.  Endogenous enforcement via repeated interaction (and/or physical coercion, as in the case 
of the Mafia) serves to mitigate the moral hazard problem associated with repayment.  Thus, credit 
market-like processes within the political sphere often ensure external financing for profitable 
redistributive ventures by sections of the working class who find their own resources inadequate.       
 Notice that the employing class may find it beneficial to contribute to the conflict expenditure 
of that section of workers which concentrates exclusively on ethnic contestation.  If this section, say 
M, is constrained in its internal resource mobilization below its optimal level, then a marginal transfer 
from R to M leads to greater ethnic contestation by the latter.  Consequently, M‟s share of social wage 
jobs rises, leading to weaker defence of the social wage by B, which in turn benefits R.  Our analysis 
therefore suggests one way in which employers may be able to „divide and conquer‟ workers.22   
                                                                                                                                                        
workers” (Davis, 1986: pp. 210-211).  The AFL-CIO opposed racial quotas in hiring as a matter of principle.  
Union membership declined from 26 to around 16% of the private-sector workforce during the 1970s. 
22
  The labour movement in Bombay was initiated by Communists in the 1920s.  Over the next four 
decades, as the region turned into India‟s industrial powerhouse, „Red Flag‟ unions acquired a large immigrant 
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 Expanding these broad-brush intuitive considerations, by explicitly modelling alternative 
sources and modes of external financing, may prove useful in understanding larger structures of 
political affiliation, within which factions of the working class are often found to be embedded.  
4.3.  General conflict success functions 
The key element in our analysis is the idea that the reduced form success rate of B in the ethnic 
conflict is an increasing function of its relative gain ( ) .  A large class of conflict success functions 
generates this outcome.  In particular, it is implied by the general asymmetric functional form: 
 
MB
BB
gg
g
s
1
 if [ 0BM gg ]; 
2
1Bs  otherwise; 
where 
Bs  is B‟s share of social wage jobs, ,1,0 1,0 .23  Our benchmark model in Section 
2, uses, for algebraic simplicity, the special case where 
2
1
, 1.  It can be easily checked that 
our Proposition 1 necessarily continues to hold with this general formulation when 
2
1
.  
Furthermore (by continuity) Proposition 1 holds even for values of  that are less than, but 
sufficiently close to 
2
1
.  A lower value of   implies higher efficiency of M in converting marginal 
conflict expenditure to success in the ethnic contest, which counteracts the lower gain to M from a 
marginal rise in success.  When  falls sufficiently close to 0, the first effect overwhelms the second.  
Then M contributes to both ethnic and class conflict, while B concentrates on ethnic contestation. 
Thus, with the general specification of the ethnic contest success function, we are in the world 
analyzed by our benchmark model in Sections 2-3 unless M is, intuitively, far more efficient than B in 
converting marginal conflict expenditure to success in the ethnic contest.  In the latter case, we come 
back, in effect, to the world where B workers are largely marginalized in the social wage labour 
market, analyzed in Section 4.1 above.  In either case, a rise in the reservation wage of either section 
of workers continues to increase the share of the other section in available social wage jobs, while 
also reducing ethnic conflict.  Such a rise improves working class success in the class conflict when it 
occurs for the section that concentrates exclusively on ethnic contestation; it reduces such success 
when it occurs to the section that participates in both class and ethnic contestation.  Again, as earlier, a 
rise in the social wage necessarily reduces B‟s share of social wage jobs, while weakening working 
                                                                                                                                                        
membership, while also coming to dominate the working class areas.  A nativist movement, the Shiv Sena, 
developed in the late '60s, combining anti-immigrant violence with attacks on Communist organizers.  SS 
violence played a major role in the precipitous decline of organized labour in Bombay in the '70s.  It has been 
widely alleged that industrialists bankrolled the SS to weaken the Communists. See, for example, Eckert (2003).   
23
  This „ratio‟ form is standard in contest theory, with applications to analyses of rent-seeking (Nitzan, 
1994), advertising (Schmalensee, 1972) and sports (Szymanski, 2003).  A possible competitor, the „difference‟ 
specification (
BM ggkB e
s
1
1
; 0k )  typically fails to yield a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. 
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class defence of the social wage when M workers concentrate on ethnic contestation, but 
strengthening such defence when B workers concentrate on ethnic contestation.  A rise in the 
reservation wage of that section of the working class which engages in ethnic contestation alone 
necessarily makes the other section better off and the employing class worse off.  A rise in the 
reservation wage of that section of the working class which engages in both ethnic and class 
contestation makes the other section better off if the positive ethnic effect dominates the negative 
class effect.  Our choice of the specific contest success function serves to establish that, in the last 
case, the ethnic effect can indeed dominate the class effect.  Evidently, for the general asymmetric 
success function, the basic trade-off (highlighted by our benchmark analysis in Sections 2-3) between 
the class effect and the ethnic effect in the last case remains, with the latter dominating the former for 
particular parametric configurations.  Analogous considerations apply to a rise in the social wage.     
A similar robustness holds with regard to general success functions for class conflict.  If the 
advanced section is significantly more efficient in class warfare, then the backward section may 
concentrate on ethnic conflict despite having a lower reservation wage.  Thus, in sum, the exact nature 
of asymmetry in contest efficiency determines the identity of the section that concentrates exclusively 
on ethnic contestation, but does not substantively alter our comparative static conclusions. 
4.4.  Reservation wage, labour supply and feedback effects   
We have assumed that workers are equally productive across ethnic groups in social wage jobs.  Thus, 
we have implicitly focused on a given skill category.  Improvements in the reservation wage of 
backward workers may change the proportion of workers in that community who belong to a given 
skill category, if they occur due to better provision of education facilities.  Thus, labour supply from 
community j   in a given skill category  may increase if some individuals move up from a lower 
category to , while it may fall if some individuals move up from  to jobs in a higher category.  So 
long as both communities can contest the entire labour demand in  (as in our benchmark model), 
the analysis does not change even if a rise in the reservation wage changes the labour supply from the 
relevant community in .  If j  cannot cover the entire labour demand in  due to lack of numbers, 
we are in the world of Section 4.1.  As discussed earlier, a rise in the reservation wage of j  directly 
reduces its incentive to contest in .  Any associated labour supply effect, if negative (a fall in labour 
supply for ) only strengthens this direct effect, leaving our comparative static conclusions invariant.  
However, if the labour supply effect is positive (so that j  can now cover a larger segment of the 
labour market in the skill category ), it increases j ‟s incentive to contest in k .  In this case, our 
conclusions hold so long as the negative direct effect dominates the positive indirect effect. 
Better health provisions for j  workers, by reducing their morbidity rates, in effect, increases 
their labour supply in any given skill category.  As discussed above, the comparative static 
consequences necessarily remain invariant in our benchmark world, and possibly so in a world where 
j  workers are numerically insufficient to meet the entire labour demand in a given skill category. 
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We have assumed that reservation wage rates are exogenously given for each ethnic group.  
The assumption here is that social wage jobs employ only a small segment of the labour force, so that 
employers face a perfectly elastic labour supply curve for each ethnic group at the respective 
reservation wage.  This assumption appears quite reasonable for most developing countries, where the 
„formal‟ sector, to which unions and labour regulations are largely confined, employs a small 
proportion of the unskilled/semi-skilled labour force.
24
  In developed countries, where coverage is 
much more extensive, or for high skill categories, the extent of absorption in social wage jobs may 
conceivably have a significant feedback effect on reservation wage rates.  Tractability considerations 
force us to abjure an explicit examination of such „second order‟ general equilibrium effects. 
4.5.  Endogenous labour demand 
We have modelled labour demand as perfectly inelastic.  This can be relaxed by allowing R to 
determine its optimal level of employment, in addition to its evasion allocation, in the first stage.  
Denoting output at employment l  by lY , 0,0 YY , and recalling (1)-(3), the payoffs become: 
BBB
BMB
BB whg
g
g
h
hh
l ;                                                                       
MMM
MMB
MM whg
g
g
h
hh
l ;                                                                 
][ lWlYh
h
h
l R
R
BR .                                                                                       
Incorporating the reaction function of the working class derived from the second stage, as earlier, the 
maximization problem of the employing class then becomes: 
2
12
1
,
1
RBR
lh
hlMax
R
WllYhR .                                                             
The first order conditions yield the equilibrium conflict expenditure of R ( Rh

) and the optimal 
employment level ( l

) as the solution to the two following equations: 
1
4
B
R
l
h


;                                                                                                              
1
4
BWlY

. 
It can be checked that, since 0Y , a rise in either reservation wage or the social wage reduces 
equilibrium employment.  However, so long as this employment effect is smaller than a threshold 
                                                 
24
  Less than 10% of the Indian workforce is covered by labour laws (Dasgupta and Marjit, 2006).  The 
situation is similar in other developing countries: the coverage typically falling in the 10-25%  range (Agenor, 
1996).  Emigration to the US between 1970 and 2000 is estimated to have generated only a 5% increase in the 
wages of unskilled (high school drop out) workers in the main source country, Mexico (Mishra, 2007).  
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value (Y  is sufficiently large in magnitude, so that employment is sufficiently inelastic), our 
conclusions, derived under the assumption of no employment effect, and summarized by Propositions 
1-4, remain unchanged.  When the employment effect is larger than this threshold value (Y  is 
sufficiently close to 0, so that employment is sufficiently elastic), a rise in either reservation wage or 
the social wage reduces employment so sharply that both sections of workers are worse off. 
 
5.  Discussion and concluding remarks 
Individuals typically acquire rights to a quantum of resources merely by virtue of their membership in 
some collectivity.  These social entitlements determine the minimal terms under which individuals are 
willing to accept employment, i.e. their reservation wage rates.  Other rights pertain to the minimal 
terms under which employers may offer employment.  These „labour rights‟, in the form of floor 
regulations on employers regarding wage, pensions, severance payments, workplace health and safety, 
leave and childcare facilities, limitations on hours and intensity of work, overtime rules, etc., aim to 
guarantee a composite „social/living‟ wage - a minimal return from accepting employment that is 
usually above what an unregulated market might provide.  Social wage thus typically generates a rent, 
which is contested by employers and workers.  Much of the quotidian conflict between trade unions 
and employers‟ organizations can be viewed as the acting out of this contestation.      
 In heterogeneous societies, one‟s social entitlements, and thus one‟s reservation wage, often 
relate systematically to one‟s ethnic or religious community origins.  It follows that organizations 
representing different communities of workers may differ in terms of their incentive to commit 
resources to enforcing the social wage.  Additionally, such organizations have an incentive to ensure a 
greater share of available social wage employment for their own respective client communities.  The 
conclusions generated by our formal analysis help us to understand the general equilibrium 
interconnections between class conflict over enforcement of the social wage and ethnic conflict 
among different sections of workers over the sharing of available social wage employment. 
Our analysis suggests that advanced workers may, indirectly, stand to benefit from greater 
social entitlements for backward workers.  Thus, we provide some micro-foundations for an argument 
of class solidarity between advanced and backward workers, grounded in an „enlightened‟ (i.e. 
general equilibrium) conception of self interest.  However, our analysis also suggests that such an 
argument may be difficult to extend beyond the sphere of social entitlements to that of „labour rights‟.  
Specifically, our investigation suggests that working class (say minority or immigrant) communities 
with weak social entitlements may share an interest, with employers and against workers from 
communities with stronger social entitlements, in keeping labour regulations (and thus the social 
wage) relatively low.  Additionally, affirmative action programs that seek to open up larger sections 
of the labour market to workers from marginalized ethnic, racial or religious communities may pit 
such groups against workers from the dominant community, benefiting employers in the process. 
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 Our results also suggest that trade union politics, i.e., an articulation of common economic 
interests of workers against employers alone, may prove insufficient to unify workers across ethnic or 
religious identity divides.  Dasgupta and Kanbur (2007), quoting historical examples, have argued 
that, instead, the provision and sharing of cultural public goods common to workers qua workers may 
hold the key to such unification.  The present analysis further highlights this idea.
25
  At the same time, 
as Dasgupta and Kanbur (2005a) have formally shown, successful unification through contribution to 
common cultural public goods, which are valued independently of their income consequences, is 
predicated on a relative equalization of earnings across different working class identity factions.  
Relative equalization of access to high (social) wage employment would appear to be indispensable 
for such equalization of earnings.  Yet, as our analysis shows, expanding employment access for an 
initially marginalized minority group may lead to greater ethnic conflict within the working class and 
consequent reduction in the overall enforcement of social wage employment.  Expanding social 
entitlements, especially in terms of subsidized housing, health, education and cash transfers, for the 
marginalized group is likely to reduce ethnic conflict in the labour market and thereby improve 
enforcement of the social wage.  However, in the absence of a prior working class identity shared 
across community divides, such expansions may be resisted in the electoral arena by the advanced 
majority of working class voters.  Arguably, these dilemmas, brought into focus by our analysis, lie at 
the heart of the resurgence of racist and xenophobic politics in many Western countries today.
26
       
 In many developing countries, weak social entitlements appear to play a stronger role than 
direct market discrimination in the economic fortunes of workers from disadvantaged communities.  
Additionally, disadvantaged communities often constitute a plurality of the working class.  In these 
countries, workers from disadvantaged communities often form the main support base for militant 
trade union movements.  Our analysis suggests that the contradictions might be different in these 
societies.  Greater social entitlements, say, through subsidized education, social housing, medical 
facilities, petty credit and homestead land might serve to „demobilize‟ backward section dominated 
unions, increasing both employ r evasion of the social wage and advanced section representation in 
                                                 
25
 One of the most successful early unions in the US, the Knights of Labor, provides an example.  “A 
typical inventory of Knights-related organizations (in this case, Detroit 1885) encompassed: „Unions, Knights of 
Labor assemblies, Working-men‟s Club Rooms, cooperative stores and factories, labor newspapers, singing 
societies, social clubs, political organizations, and a workers‟ militia(i)‟.  But the invention that most clearly 
testified to the Knights‟ project of forging a parallel proletarian civil society was the Knights of Labor „Court‟.  
… The embryonic class culture represented by the Knights not only transcended a „pure and simple‟ trade-union 
economism, but also provided the first alternative to dominant ethno-religious sub-cultures” (Davies, 1986: 
p.31). The Knights achieved a large measure of unity among Irish, German and native-born workers, as well as 
making a pioneering attempt to integrate Black workers.  Theirs was the exception in the US.  “Whereas the 
Western European class struggles of the 1880s and 1890s had spun a web of integrating proletarian institutions 
(ranging from workmen‟s clubs, cooperatives, and „labor churches‟ to casas del pueblo and workers‟ 
educational societies), the US labor movement of the late nineteenth century … failed to generate a working-
class „culture‟ that could overcome ethno-religious alignments outside the workplace” (Davis, 1986: p. 41).   
26
  Roemer et al. (2007) discuss the electoral consequences, of advanced workers‟ opposition to greater 
social entitlements for backward workers, in the US, UK, France and Denmark.  See also Lee and Roemer 
(2005) and Alesina et al. (2001) for contributions on this theme. 
Page 23 of 27
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 22 
social wage jobs.  Such demobilization in turn may lead to the political leadership of workers 
belonging to backward communities shifting to „bourgeois‟ elements within these communities. 27 
Our analysis provides a general equilibrium contest-theoretic framework around which one 
can organize empirical studies of non-electoral forms of class and ethnic conflict in labour markets 
when community origins have a significant bearing on one‟s reservation wage.  We look forward to 
such studies in the future.  In particular, we wish to highlight one possible empirical application. 
In 2005, the Indian Parliament passed the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
(NREGA).  The NREGA offers up to 100 days of employment annually per rural household on public 
works, at some local, officially determined, minimum unskilled wage rate.  It is one of the largest 
rights-based social protection initiatives in the world, costing about US$2.5bn in 2006-2007.  This 
initiative has, quite expectedly, given rise to local contestation over distribution of the rent it has 
generated.  Activists seek to organize rural workers around the demand for employment at the official 
wage, while bureaucrats, politicians and contractors are routinely accused of underpayment.  
Simultaneously, organizations representing different caste, ethnic and religious groups in the village 
attempt to increase the share of their own community in available employment at the official wage.  
Conflicts along these two, conceptually distinct, dimensions interact and condition one another.  As 
information regarding the initiative gradually spreads in the rural areas, such conflicts can only be 
expected to intensify over time.  Our framework can be usefully deployed in structuring empirical 
investigations of the emerging pattern of social conflicts around the NREGA. 
 
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1.   
Step 1: We first show that a Nash equilibrium must satisfy: [for some 0,, khBMk ].  
Suppose 0BM hh .  Then a marginal fall in Rh  increases R‟s payoff whenever 0Rh .  If 
0Rh , a marginal rise in Rh  increases R‟s payoff.  Hence, there does not exist any 0Rh  which 
constitutes a best response for R if 0BM hh .   
Step 2:  We now show that, in equilibrium, if [for some 0,, khBMk ], then 
0,0 MB gg .  Suppose, for some 0,, khBMk , and suppose 0Bg .  Then a marginal 
fall in Mg  increases M‟s payoff whenever 0Mg .  If 0Mg , a marginal rise in Mg  increases 
                                                 
27
 In India, over the last two decades, the implementation of social entitlement programs for the so-
called Backward and Scheduled castes has overlapped with a weakening of traditional Communist influence in 
these communities, and the corresponding strengthening of caste-based groups led by their respective elites.  
The Communist Party of India (Marxist), India‟s largest Left formation, has expressed alarm.  “(C)asteist forces 
can not only rally their supporters but also can influence a section of our supporters. …  The ordinary and poor 
sections of people engaged in traditional industries and agricultural sector have been with the Party because of 
struggles of many decades.  There are attempts to draw away the basic classes who are the foundation of the 
Party by using casteism.  Youth, women and other mass organisations are being strengthened on caste-basis.  It 
is also attempted to extend this tendency to the trade union and agricultural sectors” (CPI(M), 2003). 
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M‟s payoff.  Thus, there does not exist any 0Mg  which constitutes a best response for M if 
0Bg .  By an analogous argument, 0Mg  cannot constitute an equilibrium either.   
Step 3:  We now show that, in equilibrium, 0Mh .  Suppose 0Mh .   Then, by Step 2, (4) 
and (6) hold with equality.  Hence BMMB gg ; thus  (since MB ), MMBB gg .  
However, since (7) holds with equality, (7) and (5) imply MMBB gg , a contradiction.    
 Step 4:  Together, Step 3 and Step 1 imply: in any Nash equilibrium, 0,0[ MB hh ]. 
Step 5:  Together, Step 4 and Step 2 yield Proposition 1.                                                          
 
Proof of Proposition 2.   
From, respectively, (19), (16) and (20), and using A1, we get: 
0
2
1
2d
h
h
d B

.                                                                                                             (N1) 
 0
12
]21[
22
2
Bg

.                                                                                                (N2) 
0
1
1
2d
g
g
d B

.                                                                                                      (N3) 
Furthermore, since 
M
B
M
B
wW
wW
, 
0
1
MBw
,                                                                                                                  (N4) 
0
2
M
B
Mw
.                                                                                                                (N5)   
Now, noting (16),  
 
Bdw
gd

Bw
g

2
1
1
1
. 
By (N2) and (N4), ]
12
12
[
2
2
Bw
g

.  We thus get:  
0
1
1
2
Bdw
gd

.                                                                                                     (N6)     
Recall (16), (19) and (20).  Part (i) follows from (14), (N1)-(N3) and (N5).  Part (ii) is implied by 
(14), (N1), (N3), (N4) and (N6).                                                                                                             
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Proof of Proposition 3.   
Using (22) and A1, we have: 
0
12
332
33
2
BM

;                                                                                          (N7) 
(since A1 implies: [ 0363 2 ]).  Now, using (23),  
0
1
1)3632
41
1355
4 23
2233
23
23
BBB

,      (N8) 
(since, by A1, 0]363[
23
; furthermore, 1).  From (21): 
0
4 2
BR

.                                                                                                                (N9) 
From (22), (N4) and (N7), and using A1,  
0
12
132
12
1
23
2
22
B
M
B
M
ww

.                                                (N10)   
From (21), (N4) and (N9),  
0
4
1
4
1
B
R
B
R
ww

.                                                                        (N11)     
 By (N5), (N8) and (N9), 0
M
B
M
B
ww

 and 0
M
R
M
R
ww

.  In light of 
(N10) and (N11), Proposition 3 follows.                                                                                                 
 
Proof of Proposition 4.   
First note that: 
0
2
M
MB
wW
ww
W
.                                                                                                     (N12) 
Together, (14), (N1)-(N3) and (N12) imply our claims regarding conflict intensities and success 
proportions.  Now, from (21), (N9) and (N12),  
2
1
1
4
1
WW
RR

.                                                                             (N13)                                                                              
from (22), (N7) and (N12),  
0
12
1
22 WW
MM

.                                                                             (N14)                                         
From (23), (N8) and (N12),  
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WW
BB

2
2
14
121
0
1
11
3
.                                      (N15) 
 Together, (N13)-(N15) yield our claims regarding distribution.                                                            
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